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逆向选择理论，以涵盖 2004 年至 2013 年中国沪深 A 股 1,588 家民营上市公司



























Agency costs has been attracting strong focus by lots of scholars since 1976. Many 
scholars believe that the fundamental purpose of the study of corporate governance is 
to reduce agency costs and reduce the negative effects of agency costs. Maybe due to 
the difficulties in getting the internal information of listed companies in the open market, 
a lot of scholars’ study on agency costs gathered in the ownership concentration, equity 
balance degree and external regulatory environment, and less scholars consider the 
company's internal culture, institutional arrangement, competition mechanism and 
managers’ ability to study their effects on agency costs. 
Based on the principal-agent theory, upper echelons theory, informal institution 
theory, behavior theory and adverse selection theory, we used 6,627 observations 
covering 1,588 private listed companies of Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares 
from 2004 to 2013 in this paper to study the relationship between the phenomenon of 
seniority and agency costs, and the effect of analyst coverage on the relationship 
between the phenomenon of seniority and agency costs. The results show that, 
compared to those companies in which the phenomenon of seniority does not exist, the 
companies in which the phenomenon of seniority does exist perform worse in agency 
costs; Secondly, the relationship between the phenomenon of seniority and agency costs 
only exists in those companies that got low analyst coverage. 
This paper represents a preliminary study for the relationship between the 
phenomenon of seniority and corporate governance by linking managers and agency 
costs, meaning the phenomenon of seniority does influence the managers in thinking, 
psychology and behavior way and ultimately affect the agency costs. The relationship 
between corporate governance and the phenomenon of seniority is very complicated. 
We hope this paper can provide promotion for the study on the phenomenon of seniority, 
and provide a new idea and direction for the future research in the field of corporate 
governance. 
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